Innocent Suffering: The Unavailability of Post-Conviction Relief in Virginia Courts by Potter, Kaitlyn
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Student Publications School of Law
2016
Innocent Suffering: The Unavailability of Post-
Conviction Relief in Virginia Courts
Kaitlyn Potter
University of Richmond
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-student-publications
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Student Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kaitlyn Potter, Comment, Innocent Suffering: The Unavailability of Post-Conviction Relief in Virginia Courts, 51 U. Rich. L. Rev. 299
(2016).
POTTER 511 .DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016 9:41 AM 
 
299 
INNOCENT SUFFERING: THE UNAVAILABILITY OF 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IN VIRGINIA COURTS 
It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one 
innocent suffer. 
 Blackstone, Commentaries
1
 
Among the great untold stories of our time is this one: 
the last half of the twentieth century saw America’s crim-
inal justice system unravel. 
William J. Stuntz,  
The Collapse of American Criminal Justice
2
 
In 1984 in Richmond, Virginia, Thomas Haynesworth was con-
victed of raping two women and indicted for raping three others.
3
 
The first rape occurred on January 3, 1984.
4
 The assailant at-
tacked his victim at her place of employment, threatened her with 
a knife, and raped her.
5
 On January 21, another woman was sod-
omized and robbed at knife point in Richmond.
6
 On January 30, a 
man pointed a gun at a woman and forced her into a secluded 
wood.
7
 The man forced the woman to orally sodomize him.
8
 He al-
so unsuccessfully attempted to rape her.
9
 While committing these 
crimes, the gunman told the woman this was not his first time, 
but he usually used a knife rather than a gun.
10
 On February 1, a 
gunman confronted a woman in front of her Richmond home, and 
forced her back inside.
11
 The woman told her assailant her grand-
 
 1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *357. 
 2. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2011).  
 3. Haynesworth v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 197, 201, 717 S.E.2d 817, 819 (2011) 
(Elder, J., dissenting).  
 4. Id. at 201, 717 S.E.2d at 819. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. at 202, 717 S.E.2d at 819. 
 7. Id. at 202–03, 717 S.E.2d at 820. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 203, 717 S.E.2d at 820. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at 204, 717 S.E.2d at 820–21. 
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mother was in the house, but the attacker told the woman if she 
yelled he would ―take care‖ of the grandmother.
12
 Upon entering 
the home, the woman cried out.
13
 The attacker fled.
14
 
The case against Thomas Haynesworth appeared to be beyond 
reproach. After all, Haynesworth was identified by all four of his 
alleged victims.
15
 And he would spend twenty-seven years in pris-
on.
16
 But Haynesworth was innocent.
17
 
Obtaining Haynesworth‘s release and exoneration was not 
easy. Only after two Virginia prosecutors and the Attorney Gen-
eral of Virginia allied with and advocated for Haynesworth was 
he finally able to achieve complete exoneration.
18
 
According to many, the criminal justice system in the United 
States is approaching crisis.
19
 The notion of equal justice and fair 
play appear to be disappearing.
20
 Substantial national criticism 
has been directed toward Virginia‘s system of criminal justice, 
and for good reason.
21
 A spate of innocent Virginians have been 
released from prison, wrongfully convicted of heinous crimes and 
saved from doom only by happenstance, calling into question the 
Commonwealth‘s criminal courts. Virginia‘s criminal procedures 
 
 12. Id. at 204, 717 S.E.2d at 821.  
 13. Id. at 205, 717 S.E.2d at 821. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 199, 717 S.E.2d at 818. 
 16. Thomas Haynesworth, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cas 
es/thomas-haynesworth/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 17. Id.  
 18. Maria Glod & Anita Kumar, Thomas Haynesworth Exonerated in Rape Case After 
27 Years in Prison, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/tho 
mas-haynesworth-exonerated-in-rape-case-after-27-years-in-prison/2011/12/06/gIQAua5ya 
O_story.html.  
 19. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 1; Nathan Deal, How to Defeat the Criminal-
Justice Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 13, 2015, 10:44 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/nathan-deal/how-to-defeat-the-criminal-justice-crisis_b_7042638.html; Stephen M. 
Krason, On Our Dysfunctional Criminal Justice System, CRISIS MAGAZINE (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.crisismagazine.com/2013/on-our-disfunctional-criminal-justice-system; Eric T. 
Schneiderman, Ending the Crisis of Confidence in Our Criminal Justice System, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-t-schnei 
derman/ending-the-crisis-of-conf_b_7828304.html.  
 20. STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
 21. Virginia’s Justice System: Expensive, Ineffective and Unfair, JUST. POL‘Y INST. 
(Nov. 2013), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/va_justice_syst 
em_expensive_ineffective_and_unfair_final.pdf; Rob Poggenklass, Our Criminal Justice 
System Failed Jamycheal Mitchell, ACLU (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-
freely/our-criminal-justice-system-failed-jamycheal-mitchell. 
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are inflexible. Its evidentiary rules are based too much on custom 
and not enough on science. And the country‘s preeminent crime 
laboratory has admitted grave errors, which Virginia‘s courts and 
legislators have done nothing to rectify. 
This comment examines actual innocence in Virginia: the pro-
gress it has made, the problems it still faces, and the possibilities 
for reform. Part I addresses past reform to the system, spurred by 
the shocking tales of Thomas Haynesworth and others. Part II 
identifies three of the most prevalent systemic challenges mar-
ring Virginia‘s justice system: (1) flawed scientific evidence; (2) 
the premature destruction of evidence; and (3) false confessions 
and guilty pleas. Part III suggests ways in which Virginia can, 
and should, address these challenges to ensure that the justice 
system is actually serving justice. 
I.  ACTUAL INNOCENCE IN VIRGINIA 
A.  Pre-2001 Post-Conviction Law 
Prior to 2001, persons convicted in Virginia were unable to as-
sert newly realized evidence of their innocence with the courts 
unless they did so within twenty-one days of the entry of the final 
order.
22
 Within those twenty-one days, the convicted person could 
file a motion for a new trial, but following that three-week time 
period, the trial court would lose jurisdiction over the matter.
23
 
Once the trial court lost jurisdiction, defendants attempting to 
assert their innocence post-conviction had two options: petition 
for habeas corpus or seek a pardon from the Governor.
24
 
Any prisoner may file a writ of habeas corpus to attack the con-
stitutionality or legality of his trial.
25
 However, for a prisoner 
seeking exoneration, such a collateral attack falls short, as it does 
not actually prove the person‘s innocence, just the technical ille-
 
 22. VA. STATE CRIME COMM‘N, WRITS OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2008), http://vscc.vir 
ginia.gov/documents/write%20of%20actual%20innocence.pdf.  
 23. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:1 (Supp. 2016); In re Commonwealth, Dep‘t of Corr., 222 Va. 
454, 463, 281 S.E.2d 857, 862 (1981). 
 24. INNOCENCE COMM‘N FOR VA., A VISION FOR JUSTICE 96–97, 100–01 (2005) [herein-
after A VISION FOR JUSTICE]. 
 25. Id. at 97. 
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gality of the conviction.
26
 Furthermore, even a showing of actual 
innocence by the prisoner may not be sufficient evidence for a 
court to grant the writ, as many wrongful convictions occur in tri-
als that are entirely legal and procedurally error free.
27
 Habeas 
petitions are also subject to strict time constraints, in both Vir-
ginia and federal courts.
28
 For any evidence found after the expi-
ration of these limitations, a habeas petition is unavailable.
29
 
The pardon process provides a potential means by which a 
prisoner could obtain a remission of punishment and guilt.
30
 
However, although such an outlet allows the convicted person to 
escape the strict confines of the judicial process, it remains an 
imperfect means. ―Clemency is a matter of the grace and discre-
tion of the executive granting it.‖
31
 There is no mandatory review 
of applications for clemency, regardless of the strength of the ex-
onerating evidence.
32
 And despite the importance of the credibility 
of either the defendant or a newly discovered witness in making 
these determinations, the governor must decide the issue based 
on the application alone.
33
 Furthermore, political pressures may 
dissuade a governor from granting, or even examining, many of 
these applications.
34
 
Virginia prisoners are not able to escape these stringent 
boundaries by seeking relief in federal courts. As is widely recog-
nized, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(―AEDPA‖) severely limits the scope of federal habeas corpus re-
view.
35
 The AEDPA ―modifies the habeas corpus statute in a 
number of ways, affecting the disposition of federal post-
 
 26. VA. STATE CRIME COMM‘N, supra note 22. 
 27. See Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. 216, 239–40, 585 S.E.2d 801, 814–15 (2003) (barring 
an assertion of actual innocence as outside the scope of habeas corpus review, which con-
cerns only the legality of the petitioner‘s detention).  
 28. VA. STATE CRIME COMM‘N, supra note 22.  
 29. Id. 
 30. A VISION FOR JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 100. 
 31. Id. at 101. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. (noting the adverse political effects a pardon can have on a governor when his 
constituents disapprove). 
 35. Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies 
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
47 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (1997). The AEDPA was one of two major statutes on which the Republi-
can Congress and the Democratic President collaborated in 1996. Id. Both statutes limited 
the legal protections available to criminals. Id. at 1–2. 
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conviction challenges to all criminal convictions, not just those re-
sulting in death sentences.‖
36
 
But even before the AEDPA, the ability of an inmate to make 
an actual innocence claim in federal court was limited. In Herrera 
v. Collins,
37
 the Supreme Court found that it had no jurisdiction 
over Herrera‘s claim, because Texas rules required him to make 
such a claim within thirty days of his conviction in a Texas court, 
and he had failed to do so.
38
 The Supreme Court assured that ha-
beas jurisprudence would not ―cast[] a blind eye‖ toward actual 
innocence or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, but actual in-
nocence standing alone was not a cognizable constitutional claim 
rather ―a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass 
to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on 
the merits.‖
39
 
Schlup v. Delo also highlights these procedural difficulties.
40
 
Again, the Supreme Court found that the prisoner faced ―proce-
dural obstacles‖ that could only be overcome if he established a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice.
41
 The Court adopted a ―prob-
ably‖ innocent standard for those cases where the petitioner 
claims a constitutional violation and a claim of actual innocence, 
requiring a finding that ―it is more likely than not that no rea-
sonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.‖
42
 
With such stringent standards surrounding federal habeas pro-
ceedings, very few cases actually result in a finding of actual in-
 
 36. Id. at 1. 
 37. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). Herrera challenged his murder conviction and pending capi-
tal sentence, claiming that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited his execu-
tion, because he was actually innocent of the crime. Id. at 393.  
 38. Id. at 400, 418–19. 
 39. Id. at 404. This concept was reiterated in McQuiggin v. Perkins. 133 S. Ct. 1924, 
1928 (2013). 
 40. 513 U.S. 298 (1995). Schlup, who had been convicted of a prison murder, filed a 
procedurally barred habeas petition, claiming that ineffective assistance of counsel at trial 
resulted in his failure to present exculpatory evidence in the form of witness testimony 
and a videotape establishing that he was not at the scene of the murder. Id. at 303, 306. 
Although Schlup claimed actual innocence, his argument was procedural, not substantive. 
Id. at 314. Schlup asserted a constitutional claim that he was denied the opportunity to 
present his actual innocence, due to his denial of effective assistance of counsel and due 
process. Id. 
 41. Id. at 314. 
 42. Id. at 327. 
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nocence on federal habeas review.
43
 Thus, there is little hope for 
Virginia prisoners to escape the rigid confines of Virginia post-
conviction law through federal remedies. 
The Virginia State Crime Commission called Virginia‘s limited 
post-conviction scheme the most restrictive in the country.
44
 De-
spite the acknowledgement of the problem, there were limited 
calls for reform. It was not until Earl Washington‘s case that the 
majority of Virginia lawmakers started to pay attention. 
B.  The Tragedy of Earl Washington 
In 1982, Rebecca Williams, a nineteen-year-old mother of 
three, entered her home with her children.
45
 Shortly after closing, 
but not locking, the door behind her, a stranger burst through the 
door. He stabbed her several times.
46
 He then dragged her into 
the bedroom, raped her, and stabbed her again before fleeing.
47
 
Police arrived on the scene shortly thereafter, but Rebecca Wil-
liams‘ wounds were fatal.
48
 All she was able to say was that a 
black, bearded man had attacked her.
49
 
A year later, Earl Washington, a twenty-two-year-old black 
male, was arrested for burglary and malicious wounding.
50
 While 
he was in police custody, he allegedly confessed to five different 
crimes.
51
 Due to inconsistencies, four of these confessions were 
 
 43. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 205 (2011).  
 44. JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 162 (2008). 
 45. Zak M. Salih, Earl Washington Case Shows Reforms to Death Penalty, Criminal 
Cases Needed, Neufeld Says, U. VA. SCH. L. NEWS & EVENTS (Feb. 6, 2006), http://www. 
law.virginia.edu/html/news/2006_spr/neufeld.htm?=feed. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Earl Washington, INNOCENCE PROJECT [hereinafter Earl Washington, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT], http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/earl-washington (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2016).  
 51. Earl Washington, NAT‘L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS [hereinafter Earl Washington, 
NAT‘L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS], http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/pages/ 
casedetail.aspx?caseid=3721 (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
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dismissed, but one confession remained: the murder of Rebecca 
Williams.
52
 
Washington‘s confession was far from reliable. He originally 
stated the race of his victim as black.
53
 Rebecca Williams was 
white.
54
 He did not know the address of her apartment or that he 
had raped her.
55
 He stated the apartment was empty aside from 
the victim, but her children were in the home at the time of the 
attack.
56
 He claimed that the woman was short, when she was in 
fact 5‘8‖, and that he had ―stuck her . . . once or twice,‖ when she 
had in fact been stabbed thirty-eight times.
57
 
Washington had an IQ of sixty-nine, which is considered ―ex-
tremely low.‖
58
 Psychological analyses revealed his willingness to 
defer to authority figures, and the record showed that he was fed 
many of the details in the confession, which he ultimately did not 
get right until law enforcement‘s fourth attempt.
59
 Upon this 
fourth attempt, Washington signed the confession and the prose-
cution used it as the sole means to link him to the crime.
60
 
There were other issues that should have been evident during 
Washington‘s trial. The serology report on a semen stain found at 
the crime scene detected a rare plasma protein.
61
 As soon as 
Washington, who lacked this protein, became a suspect, the re-
port was amended to reflect that the test for the rare protein had 
been ―inconclusive.‖
62
 Washington‘s trial lawyer failed to intro-
duce potentially exculpatory evidence, including semen on the 
victim‘s sheets that did not match Washington‘s DNA, finger-
prints found at the scene that did not match Washington‘s, incon-
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Brooke A. Masters, Missteps on Road to Injustice, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2000), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/12/01/missteps-on-road-to-injustice 
/767d1625-f6fc-4ab3-9ead-66b8dad8d1c0/. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Earl Washington, INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 50. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.; Masters, supra note 53. 
 58. See Masters, supra note 53; IQ Classifications, ASSESSMENT PSYCHOLOGY ONLINE, 
http://www.assessmentpsychology.com/iqclassifications.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 59. Earl Washington, INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 50. 
 60. Earl Washington, NAT‘L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 51. 
 61. Earl Washington, INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 50. 
 62. Id. 
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sistencies in Washington‘s confession, and Washington‘s low 
mental capacity.
63
 
Washington was convicted and (absent any counter argument 
from his counsel) sentenced to death.
64
 Appellate courts upheld 
his conviction, and an execution date was set.
65
 Fortunately for 
Washington, a New York law firm was alerted about his case and 
achieved a stay of execution just nine days before he was sched-
uled to die.
66
 After years of the attorneys‘ attempts to show that 
the blood type of the semen found at the crime scene did not 
match Washington‘s blood type,
67
 the Virginia state laboratory fi-
nally conducted a DNA test and determined that the genetic ma-
terial found on the victim‘s body could not have come from Wash-
ington.
68
 Unfortunately, the twenty-one day rule prevented 
Washington from returning to Virginia courts to prove his inno-
cence.
69
 Then-Governor L. Douglas Wilder changed Washington‘s 
sentence to life in prison in 1994 but did not pardon him.
70
 Wash-
ington remained in custody. 
In 2000, then-Governor James S. Gilmore III was alerted of the 
Washington case and ordered further testing.
71
 Further DNA 
tests found absolutely no trace of Washington in the victim‘s 
apartment.
72
 Finally, Governor Gilmore pardoned Washington for 
the rape and murder of Rebecca Williams, and in 2001, Washing-
ton was released from prison.
73
 
 
 63. See A VISION FOR JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 79–80; Earl Washington, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, supra note 50; Masters, supra note 53.  
 64. A VISION FOR JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 79–80; Earl Washington, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, supra note 50.  
 65. Earl Washington, NAT‘L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 51.   
 66. Id. Interestingly, an attorney at the firm found out about the case from one of 
Washington‘s fellow death row inmates. Id. She brought the case to the attention of her 
firm, which decided to represent Washington pro bono. Id. 
 67. See Masters, supra note 53 (providing a full timeline of Washington‘s arduous 
struggles with the justice system). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. Though Washington had also been convicted of burglary and malicious wound-
ing, the VDOC determined that he would have been eligible for parole on those charges in 
1991. Id.; A VISION FOR JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 22. 
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The tragedy experienced by Earl Washington was not entirely 
in vain. His case led to the first comprehensive study of the Vir-
ginia laws that led to his wrongful imprisonment, and quickly 
spurred changes to the post-conviction justice system in Virgin-
ia.
74
 
C.  Virginia’s Attempts to Avoid Another Earl Washington 
In 2001, the Virginia legislature created a writ that allowed a 
prisoner to petition the Supreme Court of Virginia for relief upon 
the discovery of exonerating biological evidence, namely DNA 
found in blood, saliva, sperm, hair, or other bodily fluids. 
75
 This 
relief is available to currently incarcerated persons who pleaded 
not guilty, unless they pleaded guilty and were convicted of a 
Class 1 or 2 felony, a felony that had a maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment, or a death sentence.
76
 Furthermore, the existence 
of the exonerating evidence must have been unknown to the pris-
oner or his trial attorney at the time of the conviction, or it must 
not have been subject to scientific testing at the time.
77
 If a pris-
oner who meets the specifications files a writ with the Supreme 
Court of Virginia, and it is found that ―no rational trier of fact 
would have found proof of guilt or delinquency beyond a reasona-
ble doubt,‖ the court has the power to directly vacate that prison-
er‘s conviction.
78
 
Importantly, the time limitations in which to file such a writ 
are independent of the date of conviction.
79
 The new rule requires 
that the writ petition be filed within sixty days of the discovery of 
the exonerating evidence, allowing prisoners to escape the rigidi-
ty of the twenty-one day rule.
80
 
In 2004, the Virginia legislature continued to increase the 
availability of relief to wrongly convicted individuals. The legisla-
 
 74. Maria Glod, Former Death-Row Inmate Would Get $1.9 Million, WASH. POST (Mar. 
28, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/27/AR2007032 
702240.html; Masters, supra note 53. 
 75. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.2 (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 76. Id. 
 77. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.3 (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 78. Id.   
 79. VA. STATE CRIME COMM‘N, supra note 22.  
 80. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.3 (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
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ture developed a writ to handle instances where the newly dis-
covered evidence was non-biological in nature.
81
 Such evidence 
can include anything from fingerprints to witness testimony. 
Non-biological petitions may be filed with the Virginia Court of 
Appeals.
82
 While this writ does not require that the convicted per-
son be currently incarcerated, it does require that the person 
pleaded not guilty, with no exceptions.
83
 Furthermore, the peti-
tioner is limited to the filing of one such writ for any given convic-
tion.
84
 Again, the evidence must have been unknown to the de-
fendant and his attorney at the time of his conviction.
85
 If the 
Court of Appeals finds that ―no rational trier of fact would have 
found proof of guilt or delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt,‖ it 
has the power to reverse the petitioner‘s conviction.
86
 
Clearly, the reforms moved the system forward by leaps and 
bounds. Compared to the dreary state of affairs before 2001, the 
current system does not look so dire. But, as many legislators, of-
ficials, and law enforcement personnel have noticed, it has a long 
way to go.
87
 There have been attempts to further reform the sys-
tem in recent years, but they have for the most part failed.
88
 And 
though there have been some successful reforms, the impact of 
these reforms is unclear.
89
 Recent pronouncements from the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (―FBI‖) cause even greater cause for 
concern. A National Academy of Sciences Report on FBI forensic 
 
 81. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.10 (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.11 (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 86. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.13 (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 87. See Spencer S. Hsu, After Va. Man is Exonerated, Critics See a Broken Justice Sys-
tem, WASH. POST (May 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/after-first-
taste-of-freedom-exonerated-va-man-urges-changes-in-state-law/2015/05/14/2f4acd0a-fa55-
11e4-9ef4-1bb7ce3b3fb7_story.html.  
 88. See, e.g., Reform of Writs of Actual Innocence, H.B. 1278 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Va. 2012) (proposing the availability writs of actual innocence regardless of the plea); 
Frank Green, Sheriff Gauges Support for Innocence Panel, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Mar. 
29, 2014), http://www.richmond.com/news/local/crime/sheriff-gauges-support-for-innocence 
-panel/article_07adbdb5-e2e4-5fdc-924b-9d65c6bf23d3.html (discussing the proposed im-
plementation of a government-sponsored board tasked with reviewing convictions). 
 89. Frank Green, Appeals Court: Change to Innocence Statute Makes Little Difference, 
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (July 26, 2014), http://www.richmond.com/news/local/appeals-
court-change-to-innocence-statute-makes-little-difference/article_5421335c-c85c-5514-bb7 
-7f10b7ac7d36.html. 
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laboratory practices calls into question much of that laboratory‘s 
work and training over the past three decades. Those failures di-
rectly impact Virginia cases. 
II.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
A.  Scientific Evidence 
1.  Flawed Forensic Techniques 
Some prisoners incarcerated in the Virginia penal system were 
convicted based upon flawed science.
90
 Under Virginia‘s current 
statutory regime, there is no outlet in the law for a petitioner to 
dispute the validity of evidence that has already been tested, even 
upon the discovery of false laboratory reports or prior faulty tes-
timony by forensic experts.
91
 Unless the evidence was unknown or 
untestable at the time of the trial, one may not file an eviden-
tiary-based writ.
92
 
Furthermore, the Virginia Department of Forensic Science (the 
―Virginia DFS‖) has done very little in response to a nationwide 
acknowledgement of problems with typical evidentiary testing 
procedures. Although often considered infallible, recent studies 
call into question much of the forensic science employed in trials 
in the United States. Concerned with reports of shoddy laboratory 
work forming the basis of wrongful convictions, Congress ordered 
the National Academy of Sciences (―NAS‖) to examine ways to 
improve forensic sciences.
93
 In response, the NAS produced a re-
port (the ―NAS Report‖), which arrived at the shocking conclusion 
that most of the forensic disciplines lacked validity, and the only 
discipline ―rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently 
 
 90. Of course, we only know conclusively about those who have since been exonerated. 
See, e.g., Julius Ruffin, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/julius-
ruffin// (last visited Oct. 3, 2016); David Vasquez, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.inno 
cenceproject.org/cases/david-vasquez/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016); Troy Webb, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/troy-webb/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 91. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-327.3, 327.13 (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 92. Id. § 19.2-327.3. 
 93. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY, NAT‘L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT‘L ACADEMICS, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD xix (2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE]. 
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and with a high degree of certainty support conclusions about . . . 
‗matching‘ [] an unknown item of evidence to a specific known 
source‖ was nuclear DNA analysis.
94
 Interestingly, the NAS Re-
port noted that many of the older forensic sciences (the non-
biological sciences) were called into question by the newest foren-
sic science—DNA (the biological sciences).
95
 ―New doubts about 
the accuracy of some forensic practices have intensified with the 
growing numbers of exonerations resulting from DNA analysis 
(and the concomitant realization that guilty parties sometimes 
walk free).‖
96
 
The NAS Report called into question established forensic 
tests—such as those used to identify the source of toolmarks or 
bite marks—which had never been subjected to critical review be-
cause ―researching their limitations and foundations was never a 
top priority.‖
97
 
For example, the notion that tires and shoes leave identifiable 
impressions appears to have no scientific basis. Such items can 
certainly be differentiated, as wear over time results in individu-
alized characteristics. However, because these features continue 
to change after the commission of the crime, elapsed time follow-
ing a crime can weaken any certainty of identification.
98
 Further-
more, those engaging in such analysis are not governed by any 
recognizable benchmark.
99
 Although this calls the validity and re-
liability of the method into question, the Virginia DFS has not al-
tered its procedures regarding impression evidence, and contin-
ues to rely upon the same techniques and testimonial principles 
as it did prior to the NAS Report.
100
 
 
 94. Id. at 87. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 37. 
 97. Id. at 42. The shortcomings of bite mark evidence are demonstrated by the recent 
exoneration of Keith Allen Harward. See Spencer S. Hsu, Va. Exoneration Underscored 
Mounting  Challenges  to  Bitemark  Evidence,  WASH.  POST  (Apr. 8,  2016), https:// www. 
washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/va-exoneration-underscores-to-mounting-challeng 
es-to-bite-mark-evidence/2016/04/08/55bbfe98-fd9a-11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.html. 
Harward was convicted of a 1982 rape and murder in Virginia, based largely upon the tes-
timony of six experts who agreed that bite marks on the victim‘s leg matched Harward‘s 
bite. Id. After serving thirty-three years of his life sentence, Harward was exonerated by 
DNA testing and released. Id. 
 98. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 93, at 149. 
 99. Id.  
 100. See generally VA. DEP‘T OF FORENSIC SCI., IMPRESSIONS—FOOTWEAR AND TIRE 
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Toolmark and firearm analyses suffer from the same limita-
tions as impression evidence.
101
 Data on the variability of guns 
and toolmarks is limited, with little known about the variability 
or similarity of various tools and weapons.
102
 The NAS observed 
that ―in some cases, [individual patterns can be] distinctive 
enough to suggest one particular source, but additional studies 
should be performed to make the process of individualization 
more precise and repeatable.‖
103
 However, toolmark and firearm 
analysis lacks a precisely defined process.
104
 The analysis has no 
defined protocol and universal terms are given different mean-
ings by different analysts, requiring analysts to derive scientific 
conclusions from their own experience rather than from estab-
lished industry-wide criteria.
105
 Despite the NAS‘s observations, 
the Virginia DFS relies upon toolmark and firearm analysis to 
the same extent it did prior to the release of the NAS Report.
106
 
Hair analysis was vigorously criticized in the NAS Report. In 
fact, the report concluded that ―[n]o scientifically accepted statis-
tics exist about the frequency with which particular characteris-
tics of hair are distributed in the population. There appear to be 
no uniform standards on the number of features on which hairs 
must agree before an examiner may declare a ‗match.‘‖
107
 It de-
termined the microscopic analysis of hair samples was deeply 
flawed to such a degree that there was ―[n]o scientific support for 
the use of hair comparisons for individualization in the absence of 
nuclear DNA.‖
108
 The Virginia DFS has tweaked its reliance and 
testing of hair analysis, now only doing DNA testing of hair if the 
hair sample still has an intact root.
109
 Human hair can be exam-
 
TREAD PROCEDURES MANUAL (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.dfs.virginia.gov/wp-content/uplo 
ads/2016/09/241-D300-Impressions-Footwear-and-Tire-Tread-Procedures-Manual.pdf (out-
lining Virginia‘s current procedures for handling impression evidence). 
 101. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 93, at 154. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 155. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See generally VA. DEP‘T OF FORENSIC SCI., FIREARM/TOOLMARK PROCEDURES 
MANUAL (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.dfs.virginia.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/240-D100-
FX-TM-Procedures-Manual.pdf (outlining Virginia‘s current toolmark and firearm analy-
sis procedures). 
 107. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 93, at 160. 
 108. Id. at 161. 
 109. See VA. DEP‘T OF FORENSIC SCI., TRACE EVIDENCE PROCEDURES MANUAL, at ¶ 8.1 
(July 18, 2016), http://www.dfs.virginia.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/222-D100-Trace-
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ined if it contains tissue, generally the hair root, that is suitable 
for DNA testing.
110
 Hair fragments have been deemed unsuitable 
for DNA testing, as well as for comparison purposes.
111
 Unfortu-
nately, this change in testing procedure does not address the cir-
cumstances in which Virginia citizens have been previously con-
victed by means of the now debunked hair comparison analysis. 
Even fingerprint analysis, long deemed infallible, has been 
called into question.
112
 
For nearly a century, fingerprint examiners have been comparing 
partial latent fingerprints found at crime scenes to inked finger-
prints taken directly from suspects. Fingerprint identifications have 
been viewed as exact means of associating a suspect with a crime 
scene print and rarely were questioned. Recently, however, the sci-
entific foundation of the fingerprint field has been questioned, and 
the suggestion has been made that latent fingerprint identifications 
may not be as reliable as previously assumed.
113
 
The NAS Report recommended that validation studies be per-
formed on the forensic sciences.
114
 Nevertheless, the Virginia DFS 
has not changed its protocols.
115
 
Unfortunately, testing procedures are not the only evidentiary 
flaw in Virginia‘s criminal justice system. Even with an improved 
understanding of forensic science and its limits, many who are ac-
tually innocent would be unable to challenge their convictions be-
cause the evidence against them no longer exists. 
2.  Destruction of Evidence 
Remarkably, most of the Virginia cases that have resulted in a 
finding of actual innocence were only discovered because a Virgin-
ia laboratory technician failed to follow protocol. DFS protocols 
 
Evidence-Procedures-Manual.pdf. 
 110. Id. at ¶ 8.4. 
 111. Id. 
 112. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 93, at 43. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Paul C. Giannelli, The 2009 NAS Forensic Science Report: A Literature Review, 48 
CRIM. L. BULL. 378, 380 (2012). 
 115. See generally VA. DEP‘T OF FORENSIC SCI., LATENT PRINT PROCEDURES MANUAL 
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.dfs.virginia.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/241-D100-Latent-
Print-Procedures-Manual.pdf (outlining Virginia‘s current fingerprint and palm print 
analysis procedures). 
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require that evidence samples be returned to the agency request-
ing the results.
116
 Evidence retention in Virginia is governed by 
statute. For misdemeanor cases, Virginia law requires the reten-
tion of physical evidence until after the time period expires for a 
direct appeal.
117
 For felony cases the prescribed retention period is 
one year after the conclusion of the time period for a direct ap-
peal.
118
 For biological evidence, such as blood and DNA evidence, 
the preservation and retention standards allow for retention of 
such evidence for fifteen years, and in capital cases, until final 
judgment.
119
 
These standards fall short of those recommended by the United 
States Department of Commerce‘s National Institute of Stand-
ards and Technology (―NIST‖), the agency responsible for setting 
guidelines for national forensic testing.
120
 In general, the NIST 
recommends that the evidence be retained for open cases for the 
period of the statute of limitations.
121
 For adjudicated cases, the 
NIST found that standard practice requires evidence retention in 
most serious felonies for the period of incarceration.
122
 
Virginia protocol does not measure up to these proposals. But 
one serologist in the Virginia laboratory, Mary Jane Burton, vio-
lated protocol.
123
 Instead of returning the entire samples, she at-
tached a swatch to the case file.
124
 
Burton‘s violation of protocol preserved evidence that would 
have otherwise been destroyed, in which case Marvin Anderson 
would likely still be incarcerated. Anderson was sentenced to 210 
years for rape in 1982.
125
 The woman that Anderson allegedly 
raped testified that Anderson was the rapist, stating ―[h]is face 
 
 116. Frank Green, Scientist’s Legacy: Freedom for Two, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Feb. 
18, 2003), http://truthinjustice.org/mjburton.htm. 
 117. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 118. Id. at § 19.2-270.4(A)(ii)(i). 
 119. Id. at § 19.2-270.4:1(A)–(B).  
 120. NAT‘L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, THE BIOLOGICAL 
EVIDENCE PRESERVATION HANDBOOK: BEST PRACTICES FOR EVIDENCE HANDLERS iv (Apr. 
2013) [hereinafter BIOLOGICAL PRESERVATION HANDBOOK], http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nist 
pubs/ir/2013/NIST.IR.7928.pdf. 
 121. Id. at 4. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Green, Scientist’s Legacy, supra note 116.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Marvin Anderson, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/ 
marvin-anderson/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
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will always haunt me.‖
126
 Despite Burton‘s testimony at Ander-
son‘s trial that the fluids collected from the victim provided in-
conclusive results and that it was impossible to identify the blood 
type of the woman‘s attacker, Anderson was convicted.
127
 
Anderson always maintained his innocence.
128
 He believed DNA 
evidence would exonerate him, and he sought to have the evi-
dence tested, but was told it had already been destroyed.
129
 Final-
ly, after a request by the Innocence Project to search files related 
to Anderson‘s case, the Virginia DFS discovered a sample at-
tached to Anderson‘s file, a consequence of Burton‘s violation of 
protocol.
130
 As a result of the findings, Mark Warner, then-
Governor of Virginia, ordered additional testing of all of Burton‘s 
files, resulting in two additional findings of actual innocence.
131
 
Spurred in part by the findings gleaned from the Burton files, 
the Department of Justice tasked the Urban Institute
132
 with 
studying the physical evidence associated with the state‘s convic-
tions for homicide and sexual assault from 1973 to 1987.
133
 In its 
resulting report (the ―Urban Institute Report‖), the Urban Insti-
tute answered the question, ―What proportion of convicted offend-
ers in serious person crimes with retained forensic evidence could 
be exonerated if that evidence were DNA tested?‖
134
 The Institute 
had more than 534,000 files that involved possible qualifying 
crimes, but physical evidence had been retained in only 3000 of 
 
 126. Kristen Gelineau, Saving Grace, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2005), https://www.washing 
tonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/2005/10/09/saving-grace/d15ff40d-51c1-4a79-97a9-f4b1f98b5 
62b/.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Anthony Brooks, Virginia Case Review Revives DNA Debate, NAT‘L PUB. RADIO 
(Jan. 25, 2006, 6:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5171456.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. The sample not only exonerated Anderson, but also implicated another man, 
who was subsequently convicted of rape. Green, Scientist’s Legacy, supra note 116; see su-
pra text accompanying notes 123–24. 
 131. Brooks, supra note 128. 
 132. The Urban Institute, headquartered in Washington, D.C., is a research and advo-
cacy organization that ―helps identify solutions for neighborhoods, cities, states, and na-
tional criminal justice systems‖ by ―analyz[ing] crime trends and evaluat[ing] prevention 
initiatives.‖ Crime and Justice, URBAN INST., http://www.urban.org/research-area/crime-
and-justice (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).  
 133. JOHN ROMAN, KELLY WALSH, PAMELA LACHMAN & JENNIFER YAHNER, URBAN 
INST. JUSTICE POL‘Y CTR., POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING AND WRONGFUL CONVICTION 
1–2 (June 2012), http://www.urban.org/research/publication/post-conviction-dna-testing-
and-wrongful-conviction. 
 134. Id. at 2.  
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those, with potential suspects identified in 2100 of those cases.
135
 
In 230 cases, data existed that allowed the Urban Institute to 
evaluate the DNA evidence and come to some conclusions regard-
ing the validity of the underlying convictions.
136
 Much, though not 
all, of this evidence was from the Burton files.
137
 
The findings of the Urban Institute Report were astounding. In 
56 of those 230 testable cases, the convicted offender was elimi-
nated as the source of DNA evidence, and for 38 convictions, DNA 
elimination supported exoneration.
138
 Considering the limited vol-
ume of testable data, much of it from the Burton files, as a matter 
of purely statistical analysis, a significant number of those con-
victed before that widespread advent of DNA testing may have 
been wrongfully convicted. 
3.  Official Reaction to the Reports 
Spurred partially by the results of the NAS Report and the Ur-
ban Institute Report, the FBI began a review of all its forensic 
practices—a review that is still ongoing—and concluded that its 
laboratories were riddled with errors and faulty reporting.
139
 To 
date, hair analysis has been most intensely criticized, and various 
governmental and private organizations have taken some form of 
action in response to the flaws in hair analysis. Regarding its hair 
analysis and training of hair and fiber analysis examiners, the 
FBI ―agree[d] that error has been found in over 90 percent of the 
trial transcripts that were reviewed.‖
140
 The FBI also concluded 
―nearly all of the FBI analysts who testified exceeded the limits of 
science in their testimony or lab work (26 of 28 examiners).‖
141
 
And the problem was not limited to the FBI analysts, because 
almost every state‘s examiners were trained by the FBI laborato-
 
 135. Id. at 4. 
 136. Id. at 5. 
 137. Id. at 12. 
 138. Id. at 5. 
 139. Amelia Maxfield, FBI Microscopic Hair Comparison Review: State and Local Hair 
Reviews, CHAMPION, Mar. 2016, at 59 (citing Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, FBI Testimony on Microscopic Hair Analysis Contained Errors in at Least 90 Percent 
of Cases in Ongoing Review (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-re 
leases/fbi-testimony-on-microscopic-hair-analysis-contained-error-in-at-least-90-percent-of 
-cases-in-ongoing-review).  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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ries, and thus committed the same errors in analysis and testi-
mony.
142
 
Some state agencies took action as a result of the FBI an-
nouncement. The Texas Forensic Science Commission is conduct-
ing a Texas Hair Microscopy Case Review.
143
 The Review‘s pur-
pose is to bring together subject matter experts and attorneys to 
determine a process and criteria to review Texas convictions that 
were based in whole or in part on hair analysis.
144
 
Iowa‘s Governor, in cooperation with Iowa‘s State Public De-
fender, created a Wrongful Conviction Division at the Office of 
the State Public Defender.
145
 Iowa‘s Wrongful Conviction Division 
will work in partnership with the Innocence Project of Iowa and 
the Midwest Innocence Project to investigate and, where appro-
priate, litigate those cases in which individuals claim they have 
been wrongfully convicted.
146
 Additionally, the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers is assisting lawyers nationwide 
in initiating hair analysis reviews.
147
 While some states have tak-
en steps to review cases involving hair analysis, few federal or 
state courts have reacted to the FBI‘s renouncement of hair anal-
ysis, and almost no courts have excluded evidence based upon the 
NAS Report. Few have even expressed concern. 
For example, eminent jurist Judge Richard Posner of the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals cited to the NAS Report, but he did 
so in a fashion that indicated he was essentially unaware of the 
nature of the report. In United States v. Herrera,
148
 Judge Posner, 
writing for the Court, relied upon the NAS Report to describe the 
analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification (―ACE-V‖) 
method of fingerprint analysis, but never referenced the NAS‘s 
concerns about fingerprint analysis, or the general conclusions 
 
 142. Maxfield, supra note 139, at 59. 
 143. Texas Hair Microscopy Case Review, TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM‘N, http://www. 
fsc.texas.gov/texas-hair-microscopy-case-review (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).  
 144. Id. 
 145. Governor, SPD Announce Creation of Wrongful Conviction Division, OFF. STATE 
PUB. DEF. (Oct. 26, 2015, 8:30 AM), https://spd.iowa.gov/governor-spd-announce-creation-
wrongful-conviction-division.  
 146. Id. 
 147. Maxfield, supra note 139, at 60.  
 148. 704 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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about forensic sciences in general.
149
 Instead, Posner found fin-
gerprint analysis to be a solid methodology. 
Fingerprint experts such as the government‘s witness in this case—
who has been certified as a latent print examiner by the Interna-
tional Association for Identification, the foremost international fin-
gerprint organization (there are only about 840 IAI-certified latent 
examiners in the world, out of 15,000 total examiners)—receive ex-
tensive training; and errors in fingerprint matching by expert exam-
iners appear to be very rare.
150
 
While nodding to the NAS‘s concern about subjective judgment, 
the Seventh Circuit determined that ―responsible fingerprint 
matching is admissible evidence, in general and in this case.‖
151
 
Further, in Herrera, the Seventh Circuit was examining the 
fingerprint evidence applying the Daubert test.
152
 Thus, even un-
der a standard formulated to prevent the introduction of ―junk 
science,‖ testimony that may have been flawed is regularly al-
lowed before federal and state juries, including federal juries in 
the Fourth Circuit.
153
 
Virginia does not follow Daubert, but instead employs a less 
stringent test that merely requires the witness to be an expert 
and have scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.
154
 
Additionally, Virginia courts do not follow the Frye test,
155
 the 
 
 149. Id. at 484. 
 150. Id. at 486–87. 
 151. Id. at 487. Other challenges based upon the NAS Report have been rejected. See, 
e.g., United States v. Otero, 849 F. Supp. 2d 425, 438 (D. N.J. 2012); Johnston v. State, 27 
So.3d 11, 23 (Fla. 2010).  
 152. Herrera, 704 F.3d at 486–87.  Under Daubert, evidence is admissible when it 
meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 
149 (1999).  Rule 702 states that an expert may testify if: ―(a) the expert‘s scientific, tech-
nical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.‖ FED. R. EVID. 702.  
 153. See United States v. Council, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1011 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding 
that a forensic scientist‘s method for examining palm prints was sufficiently reliable, and 
although mentioning the findings of the NAS Report, referring to the NAS as ―commenta-
tors,‖ and omitting the fact that the report was commissioned by the Department of Jus-
tice); United States v. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536 (E.D. Va. 2010) (finding that the 
NAS Report does ―not bind federal courts‖). 
 154. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 97–98, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (1990). 
 155. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test is a rather strin-
gent evidentiary standard requiring general acceptance in the ―particular field in which it 
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standard that Daubert replaced.
156
 When scientific evidence is of-
fered, Virginia courts make a threshold finding of fact regarding 
the reliability of the scientific method offered, but if ―it is of a 
kind so familiar and accepted as to require no foundation to es-
tablish the fundamental reliability of the system, such as finger-
print analysis,‖ then it is admissible.
157
 On the other hand, if the 
methodology has been deemed unreliable in the past and its ex-
clusion has become a rule of law, as is the case regarding lie-
detector tests, it is inadmissible.
158
 
Thus, Virginia‘s evidentiary rules do little to inhibit flawed sci-
ence from being introduced at trial, and rely on inherently unre-
liable hair analyses, fingerprints, and other forensic sciences that 
have been called into question by the NAS. 
B.  False Confessions and Guilty Pleas 
In Virginia, most confessions are not taped, and once a defend-
ant pleads guilty, the guilty plea is infallible against attack. If an 
innocent person is challenging a plea based upon non-biological 
evidence, Virginia courts cannot grant relief based upon actual 
innocence if the person pled guilty at trial.
159
 And in cases involv-
ing biological evidence, a guilty plea prevents an innocent person 
from challenging the plea, even if that person is completely inno-
cent or is sentenced to death, or convicted of ―(i) a Class 1 felony, 
(ii) a Class 2 felony, or (iii) any felony for which the maximum 
penalty is imprisonment for life.‖
160
 
These restrictions would have little impact on the integrity of 
criminal justice in Virginia if all confessions were sound and all 
guilty pleas valid. But one of the most significant and indeed 
most disturbing findings of recent studies is the number of false 
confessions and false guilty pleas that infect the justice system. 
Of the 250 first DNA exonerations in the United States, forty 
were supported at least in part by a false confession.
161
 And 6 per-
 
belongs.‖ Id. at 1014.  
 156. Spencer, 240 Va. at 97, 393 S.E.2d at 621.  
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.10 (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 160. Id. § 19.2-327.2.  
 161. GARRETT, supra note 43, at 18.  
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cent of those exonerated pleaded guilty.
162
 Earl Washington‘s case, 
discussed above, is just one example of this phenomenon. 
What explains these numbers? A recent study examined how 
―the bluff technique‖ led to a large number of false confessions.
163
 
The study‘s subjects were instructed to complete a task and then 
were falsely accused of such things as crashing the computer or 
cheating.
164
 By introducing bluffs, false evidence, and false eye-
witnesses, the study‘s authors identified variables that might 
produce a false confession.
165
 The study‘s findings are remarkable 
and, in the context of false confessions, disturbing. In one test 
group, forty-three of seventy-one participants confessed that they 
had pressed a computer key they had been instructed to avoid 
when, in fact, they had not.
166
 Another group produced similar re-
sults.
167
 Some of those who wrongfully confessed did so because 
they simply wished to finish the interrogation, and some even 
confessed because they felt sympathy for the interrogator.
168
 Nine-
ty percent of subjects who believed that a hidden camera had cap-
tured their actions confessed, while only 27 percent of control 
subjects did.
169
 
Though usually unwittingly, police often contribute to false 
confessions. Frequently, the false confessions are contaminated 
with details that only the real perpetrator or the police would 
know.
170
 Even though trained to avoid doing so, the police may re-
lease details of the crime in an attempt to coax the suspect to tell 
a story.
171
 ―These false confessions [are] so persuasive, detailed, 
and believable that judges repeatedly [uphold] the convictions 
during appeals and habeas review.‖
172
 In response to concerns 
about false confessions, twenty-one states and the District of Co-
lumbia now require or at least encourage electronic recordings of 
 
 162. Id. at 150.  
 163. Jennifer T. Perillo & Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: The Lie, The Bluff, and 
False Confessions, 35 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 327, 328–29 (2011). 
 164. Id. at 329–30. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. at 330. 
 167. Id. at 331. 
 168. Id. at 332. 
 169. Id. at 334. 
 170. GARRETT, supra note 43, at 19–20, 23–31. 
 171. Id. at 22–23. 
 172. Id. at 21. 
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some or all interrogations, and many additional states‘ supreme 
courts have opinions either requiring or encouraging the record-
ings of interrogations.
173
 Virginia is not one of these states. 
While false confessions may be explained by faulty interroga-
tion techniques, it still does not explain why innocent people go so 
far as to plead guilty. United States District Court Judge Jed S. 
Rakoff of the Southern District of New York is not surprised by 
false guilty pleas. Considering the personal circumstances of 
those confessing—often mentally ill, impaired, or poorly educat-
ed—Judge Rakoff believes that under the circumstances, the per-
son pleading guilty is making a rational decision.
174
 
While, moreover, a defendant‘s decision to plead guilty to a crime he 
did not commit may represent a ―rational,‖ if cynical, cost-benefit 
analysis of his situation, in fact there is some evidence that the pres-
sure of the situation may cause an innocent defendant to make a 
less-than-rational appraisal of his chances for acquittal and thus de-
cide to plead guilty when he not only is actually innocent but also 
could be proven so. Research indicates that young, unintelligent, or 
risk-averse defendants will often provide false confessions just be-
cause they cannot ―take the heat‖ of an interrogation. Although re-
search into false guilty pleas is far less developed, it may be hypoth-
esized that similar pressures, less immediate but more prolonged, 
may be in effect when a defendant is told, often by his own lawyer, 
that there is a strong case against him, that his likelihood of acquit-
tal is low, and that he faces a mandatory minimum of five or ten 
years in prison if convicted and a guidelines range of considerably 
more—but that, if he acts swiftly, he can get a plea bargain to a less-
er offense that will reduce his prison time by many years.
175
 
Why then are writs of actual innocence not available to defend-
ants who are faced with the dilemma that Judge Rakoff de-
scribes? Does a defendant‘s inability to ―take the heat‖ mean that 
person should later be denied the opportunity to retract his false 
confession? And if someone is facing likely conviction, should he 
be punished for his attempt to achieve a lower sentence for a 
 
 173. See GARRETT, supra note 43, at 248; Thomas P. Sullivan, Nat‘l Ass‘n of Criminal 
Def. Lawyers, Compendium: Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations (2014), 
https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=33287&libID=33256 (including 
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Ver-
mont, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia). 
 174. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/. 
 175. Id. 
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crime he did not commit? This statutory limitation may be well- 
intentioned, but surely it has some consequences that must be 
taken into account. 
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite some steps in the right direction, Virginia‘s criminal 
justice system remains fundamentally flawed in that it stifles re-
view of past convictions and relies on outdated methods. The dis-
credited testimony called into question by the NAS and the FBI 
may have been (and may continue to be) the basis for many of the 
convictions in Virginia. Additionally, Virginia has systematically, 
albeit innocently, destroyed evidence that may be exculpatory. 
Furthermore, false confessions may be the result of imperfect in-
terrogation procedures. And guilty pleas, even those made by in-
nocent people, act as a bar from future relief under Virginia‘s rig-
id statutory framework. Virginia must expand the ability of post-
conviction remedies in its courts so that the truly innocent can 
prove their actual innocence. Significant strides can be taken to 
ensure, to the best of the Commonwealth‘s ability, that no inno-
cent person stands wrongfully convicted. To do so, the Common-
wealth should take these five substantial but feasible steps. 
First, the Virginia legislature should eliminate all limitations 
on actual innocence challenges for a ten-year period. This would 
allow those who may have been convicted based upon flawed sci-
entific evidence called into question by the NAS Report to chal-
lenge those convictions. As it currently stands, if the convicted 
person had that evidence at trial, they are barred from filing a 
writ of actual innocence, notwithstanding any potential flaws in 
the results.
176
 Virginia must finally explicitly address the NAS 
Report and allow prisoners to assert actual innocence if their con-
viction was indeed the result of flawed scientific evidence. The 
ten-year period will also allow governmental agencies such as the 
FBI to continue to analyze databases, examine its testing and tes-
timonial protocols, and determine what cases may be affected by 
flawed scientific evidence. The ten-year timeframe appears rea-
sonable considering it did take the FBI almost five years to de-
bunk much of its testimony and training regarding hair analy-
 
 176. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.3, -327.13 (Repl. Vol. 2015).  
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sis.
177
 To avoid the courts flooding with challenges, a pre-litigation 
innocence panel could be created to review the cases first, rather 
than sending each and every contested evidence case straight to 
the courtroom. Of course, any surge in litigation would likely only 
be temporary. And as Judge Henry Friendly, one of the greatest 
judges of the twentieth century confirmed, ―[t]he policy against 
incarcerating or executing an innocent man . . . should far out-
weigh the desired termination of litigation.‖
178
 
Second, the Virginia legislature should relax the prohibition for 
those claiming actual innocence in non-biological and biological 
evidence cases. Both science and practical experience establish 
that innocent people falsely confess, and even plead guilty.
179
 As 
Judge Rakoff commented, many of those innocent people pleading 
guilty are making what appears to them to be a ―rational‖ deci-
sion.
180
 It, therefore, seems almost arbitrary to create a dividing 
line between those that plead guilty and those that plead not 
guilty. Of course, there are countless cases in which those who 
plead guilty are guilty. But there are also cases in which those 
who plead not guilty are guilty. So why is there a punishment for 
a guilty plea? Likely, the idea is that there must be some conse-
quence for pleading guilty. But is this significant enough of a rea-
son for society to countenance the incarceration of the innocent? 
Consider, for example an innocent defendant who pleads guilty 
to rape. The defendant may be intellectually handicapped. In-
formed by counsel that he has been positively identified and that 
facing a jury could result in a substantial sentence, he pleads 
guilty. Consider, also, a guilty defendant who pleads not guilty to 
rape, but is still convicted. After all, he is guilty. Based upon the 
pleas of these defendants, the guilty man would be able to file a 
writ (though likely it would fail) and the innocent man would be 
barred. With the requirement to register, often for life, for sexual-
ly related offenses, the innocent man would be subjected to a po-
tential lifetime of ostracism, even after his prison sentence was 
 
 177. See Maxfield, supra note 139, at 59. 
 178. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?: Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. CHI L. REV. 142, 150 (1970) (quoting Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of 
State Convictions: An Interplay of Appellate Ambiguity and District Court Discretion, 68 
YALE L.J. 98, 101 n.13 (1958)).  
 179. See supra Part II.B.  
 180. Rakoff, supra note 174. 
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completed, although he was entirely innocent. Recent studies and 
court cases establish that this has, and is, happening.
181
 The in-
tegrity of Virginia‘s criminal justice system demands protections 
be placed into the system to prevent it from happening again. 
Deleting the ―guilty/not guilty‖ requirement from statutes 
would result in equity among those convicted, regardless of the 
circumstances under which they were convicted. And, considering 
the multitude of evidence regarding the inconsistencies between 
pleas and actual guilt of defendants, it is unreasonable to main-
tain such a distinction. 
Third, Virginia must substantially modify its procedures for re-
taining evidence. As described above, five innocent men were ex-
onerated only through Mary Jane Burton‘s failure or refusal to 
comply with evidence-retention standards.
182
 Had she abided by 
the rules, there would have been no evidence to test and, there-
fore, no way of proving the innocence of these wrongfully convict-
ed men. Retention of evidence should become an absolute re-
quirement in Virginia. The current practice of retaining evidence 
in capital cases must be maintained, but efforts must be made to 
retain evidence for longer periods in other cases as well. 
To further that aim, the Virginia forensic crime labs should 
adopt the retention recommendations of the NIST.
183
 Labs should 
retain evidence for open cases for the period of the statute of limi-
tations.
184
 For adjudicated cases, they should retain all evidence 
in serious felony cases for the period of incarceration.
185
 These ev-
idence retention policies balance the needs of justice with the fis-
cal and practical limitations faced by municipalities in the Com-
monwealth. 
Fourth, to combat the problem of false confessions, the Com-
monwealth should adopt those standards governing taped confes-
sions followed by a number of other states.
186
 Such taping will al-
low for review and regulation of interview procedures, increasing 
accountability and possibly leading officers to think twice about 
 
 181. See supra Part II.B. 
 182. See supra notes 123–31 and accompanying text.  
 183. BIOLOGICAL PRESERVATION HANDBOOK, supra note 120, at 1–5. 
 184. Id. at 4. 
 185. Id. 
 186. GARRETT, supra note 43, at 248; Sullivan, supra note 173. 
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the manner in which they are conducting interviews. While, of 
course, taping confessions alone will not likely reduce the number 
of false confessions, it would likely contribute to a reduction in 
the number of false confessions that result in convictions. Taped 
confessions could be viewed by the jury, and, if necessary, could 
be accompanied by testimony from experts attesting to the man-
ner in which the defendant made his confession. Viewing the na-
ture of the confession is often important to a jury in its determi-
nation of guilt.
187
 Certainly, had a jury seen the full confession of 
Earl Washington, they would have seen how he was led to the 
―correct‖ confession, getting it wrong numerous times before he 
finally said what the detectives wanted to hear. 
Adopting a practice of taped confessions would help to ensure 
that coerced or false confessions were seen as just that: coerced or 
false confessions. Therefore, following the leads of the states that 
have adopted such practices will greatly reduce the instances of 
false confessions that lead to convictions in Virginia. 
Fifth, Virginia should adopt an evidentiary rule similar to Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 702 and apply Daubert in interpreting that 
new rule. Rule 702 as interpreted by Daubert is fashioned to al-
low the admission of scientific evidence that assists the trier of 
fact, but also carries safeguards of reliability.
188
 The Rule has 
been applied to call into question precisely the type of evidence 
that the NAS Report found flawed.
189
 District courts have relied 
on Daubert to reevaluate and exclude ―scientific evidence that 
had long been accepted by the courts.‖
190
 
On the other hand, the Spencer test employed in Virginia 
courts places great faith in methods that the courts are familiar 
with and have admitted in the past. Spencer allows the admission 
of evidence that ―is of a kind so familiar and accepted as to re-
quire no foundation to establish the fundamental reliability of the 
system, such as fingerprint analysis.‖
191
 But that ―familiar and ac-
 
 187. See Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions: From Colonial Salem, Through Central 
Park, and into the Twenty-First Century, in THE WITNESS STAND AND LAWRENCE S. 
WRIGHTSMAN, JR. 55 (Cynthia Willis-Esquesda & Brian H. Bornstein eds. 2016).   
 188. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 189. Henry F. Fradella, Lauren O‘Neill & Adam Fogarty, The Impact of Daubert on 
Forensic Science, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 323, 331 (2004). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 97, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (1990). 
POTTER 511 .DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016 9:41 AM 
2016] INNOCENT SUFFERING 325 
 
cepted‖ evidence is precisely the type of evidence called into ques-
tion by the NAS Report.
192
 Adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
would force Virginia trial courts to reevaluate those forensic prac-
tices earlier deemed fundamentally reliable, allowing both those 
already convicted and those newly accused to challenge those 
methodologies in court. 
CONCLUSION 
Thomas Haynesworth was wrongfully convicted of rape. Other 
Virginians have only recently been vindicated and released. As a 
matter of justice, the Commonwealth must do all in its power to 
ensure innocent persons are not convicted and incarcerated. A 
system that requires two county prosecutors and the Attorney 
General of the Commonwealth to fight to free an innocent man is 
inherently flawed. The proposed changes offered above would 
move Virginia closer to having a justice system that all Virgini-
ans can trust, and a system of which all Virginians can be proud. 
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